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paper.SUBSOIL MINERALS CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY to the annual
income of the United States, not only as sources of energy but
also as raw materials of industry. In 1929 the approximate
value of mineral output totaled $5,887,600,000. In 1939 it had
fallen slightly—to $4,874,000,000—but in 1946 it reached a peak
of $8,900,000,000. Through many years, the mineral industries
have grown rapidly, even at an accelerating rate. Between 1899
and 1939 output from mines and quarries increased more than
twice as much as that of agriculture and almost as much as
manufacturing. Fuels and nonmetals increased most; but pro-
duction of metals, though growing faster than agricultural out-
put, fell behind manufacturing. The indexes of production,
taking the output for 1899 as 100, were metals, 224; fuels, 430;
other nonmetals, 382; total, 366; manufacturing, 374; agri-
culture, 159.1
Are we, as a nation, overproducing and exhausting our
resources at a dangerous rate? The matter is vital because the
mineral industries do not have a perennial base for operations,
being dependenton irreplaceable mineral deposits. Thus min-
ing, in contrast to manufacturing and agriculture, is a wasting
asset industry. It is, then, all the more important to measure,
if possible, total deposits and determine the place of subsurface
minerals among the assets of the nation. Though, for many
reasons treated in greater detail below, such an estimate is nec-
essarily imperfect, it has been felt worth while to make such a
start as may be possiblç at this time in full recognition of the
difficulties of the problem and the incompleteness of any result
likely to be attained.
The work falls naturally into two stages: first, estimating the
amounts of the various minerals known to exist in the ground;
second (for purposes of comparison and for fitting the results
into a national balance sheet), evaluating these known reserves.
Only the known reserves, or at most those reasonably to be
• expected to be produced within a period in which the present
worth of the dollar is significant, can be covered. Probably





thereare large quantities of minerals in the ground that at
some future time will come into use; but if knowledge concern-
ing them is so indefinite that they cannot be measured, no
tangible value can now be assigned to them. Moreover, if they
cannot be produced and marketed within some reasonable
period, say fifty years, their present worth is so small that their
omission from the balance sheet will not materially invalidate
the results. To see far into the future is as difficult as to see far
into the ground, and any attempt to determine what may be
true more than one generation or, at most, two ahead may well
be as harmful as helpful. In the actual process of buying and
selling, estimates of mineral reserves are usually based on sup-
plies for 20 to 25 years or, at the highest, 50 years, not only
because many unknown factors influence production and price
but also because the present worth of future profits decreases
as the years accumulate. The present value varies with the in-
terest rates assumed; 2at5 percent compounded annually, a
dollar that will not be received for 20 years has a present worth
of only 38 cents. If payment is deferred 30 years, the present
value decreases to 23 cents, if to 40 years, to 14 cents, and at 50
years it becomes as little as 9 cents. Since money that can earn
5 percent and be compounded at the same rate will double it-
self in 15 years and even if it earns only 3 percent will double
in 24 years, to put one's money in a savings bank or insurance
annuity may obviously be more profitable than to invest it in
the risky business of mining.
The United States Department of the Interior has recently
completed, through the joint activities of the Geological Sur-
vey and the Bureau of Mines, a general summary of estimates
of the amounts of the various mineral resources in the ground,
taking into account present standards of quality and methods
of production. This has been presented to Congress and pub-
lished as the appendix to a Congressional document.8 Though
2Seee.g.,tables in Mine Examination and Vahtation, Baxter and Parks
(Michigan College of Mining and Technology, 1939).
8Investigationof National Resources, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Public Lands of the United States Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
May 1947.238 PARTII
themost comprehensive statement of ore reserves yet made, its
limitations must be understood in order to avoid misinterpre-
tation. Only ores and mineral deposits workable under condi-
tions similar to the present were considered. If the cost of
wages, supplies, and taxes rises and the price of the product is
not raised correspondingly, known reserves may well become
unworkable, as has already happened in the case of many gold
mines, such as the great Alaska-Juneau. Technological prog-
ress will often narrow the gap between cost and price, though
probably not in the instance cited, as both technology and the
scale of operations seem to have already been pushed to the
limit to reduce costs. Advances in technology have, however,
so far proved the most effective safeguard for the future; many
a mine after having been worked for years has shown a larger
reserve than at the beginning, not only because more ore of the
same grade has been found but also because better methods
have made it possible to work ore of a grade previously deemed
not workable. Notable illustrations abound in the so-called
'porphyry copper' deposits, where rock has been converted
into ore by improvements in technology, administration, and
financing on an enormous scale. Our country would be really
starved for copper if only the grade of ore worked at the begin-
fling of this century could now be mined at a profit. In the last
decade of the 19th century, it was considered notable that ores
containing as little as 5 percent copper could be profitably
mined; but for some years much of the copper mined has been
won from ores containing less than 1 percent. In large mines
the 'cut-off point', or that below which the material mined is
sent to the waste dumps rather than the mill, has been 0.4 per-
cent copper. In some mines at certain times it has been even
lower. The statement that our known reserves will' supply us
for only a certain number of years at present rates of produc-
tiOn is a yellow warning, not a red, and the green light may not
be as far away as even the next corner.
Sometimes for technical and at other times for financial rea-
sons, it is not always advisable to develop ore reserves too far
ahead of the market. The great Mother Lode of California hasSUBSOIL WEALTH 239
producedgold in quantity for almost a century, yet it is doubt-
ful that measurement of the ore reserves in sight would often
have shown more than a two years' supply ready for mining.
The principal reason has been that, under conditions on the
Mother Lode, it is frequently difficult and expensive to hold a
drift for more than two years without retimbering. As this
operation is expensive, opening ground too far ahead of actual
mining is wasteful and is not done. Actually the operating com-
panies have instead relied upon experience—they will be able
to open more ground as rapidly as it becomes needed. Although
there have been disappointments and some losses, the policy
has on the whole proved wise. A small ore reserve therefore does
not necessarily mean a short life for a mine. Only for special
reasons, such as determining whether to invest large sums in
reequipping a property, introducing a new method, or obtain-
ing a larger position in some projected combination, is it cus-
tomary to do more than a minimum of advance development.
It is, though, not beyond a miner to dress up a mine for sale
even if that does not conduce to maximum ultimate profit from
the property.
Under other conditions, such as hard, firm walls or small
pumping expense, it may well be that financial reasons, such
as security for large investment, may make it sound to carry a
larger ore reserve, measured in terms of the known life term
of the mine. For example, in the Homestake, the largest Ameri-
can gold mine, physical conditions permit holding ground
open at small expense; the occurrence of the ore is such that to
be sure of reserves it is important to know in advance as much
as possible about the ground to be opened up, and the heavy
investment makes security important. So it has been the gen-
eral policy of the Homestake Company to keep approximately
ten years' ore supply developed ahead. The advantages in this
case outweigh the disadvantages, such as the accumulating
interest charge on the money spent on advance development
and the risk of excessive taxation in a region where only a
small fraction of the voting population is engaged in mining.
The danger of excessive taxation is one a prudent mine man-240 PARTII
ager must constantly keep in mind in planning development.
The sporadic distribution of ores, the general belief that ore
deposits are treasure troves to the major part of which society
as a whole is entitled, and the increasing pressure on tax
authorities to produce additional revenue, render mines espe-
cially vulnerable from the taxation point of view, and many
and diverse types of tax have come into being. It is not easy to
determine a just tax on mines or on minerals in the ground,
but the disposition of the authorities to tax everything in sight
naturally leads mining companies to put as little ore in sight in
advance of mining as possible. This, in turn, adds to the diffi-
culty of determining how much national wealth is under-
ground.
The experience of the Minnesota mining companies is prob-
ably as well documented as any. In this state lie the largest iron
ore reserves of the United States, and records are available for
more than thirty years. The mines are in a small section of a
large state dominated by agriculture; the voting power of the
miners is small compared with that of the wheat farmers. The
Department of Taxation has wide authority and a competent
staff of engineers and accountants who use accepted methods
in calculating the ore reserves. Nonetheless, there are loud
complaints against the amount of taxes collected, particularly
those taken by county and local authorities, with charges of
extravagance and waste in local government in consequence
of the ease with which money can be raised by taxing the
mines. The matter is of national interest, since little ore is used
in Minnesota and any addition to the price due to taxation is
borne by the people of the entire country who buy iron and
steel products. The Department of Taxation collects both ad
valorem and occupation taxes and collects from both the min-
ing company and the royalty owner.
As of May 1, 1945 total ore in the ground was calculated to
be 1,034,300,000 tons. The assessed valuation was placed at
$129,306,000 or 12.5 cents per ton in the ground. On this there
were collected in 1945 $20,600,432 in taxes, made up of
$6,249,985 occupation tax, $1,762,134 royalty tax, and $12,-SUBSOIL WEALTH 241
588,313 ad valorem ($1,019,654 in state, $3,291,772 in county,
and $8,276,887 in local taxes). The ore shipped totaled 62,830,-
572 tons, and the tax collected came to $0.328 per ton
not per ton assessed. The amount of taxes collected per year
has remained fairly steady for twenty years; and, as shipments
have varied greatly, the 'taxes paid per ton shipped have also
varied, rising steeply in depression years when shipments were
small. In 1932 the taxes collected amounted to $7.348 per ton;
and the average sale price of Minnesota hematite ore, calcu-
lated back to the mine, was These figures would seem
to be largely responsible for the fog that clouds the public mind
with doubt concerning the adequacy or inadequacy of the
Lake Superior iron ore reserves for the safety of the United
States. Actually there are many excellent reasons for expecting
a much longer life term for the Minnesota iron mines than
that calculated by dividing the known reserves by the expected
requirements each year.5 The crucial factor is the ratio between
the rate of use and the rate of discovery, including additions
due to improvements in technology. These factors will be dis-
cussed in more detail in connection with, the valuations pro-
posed below. In a general way, it may be stated that many min-
ing corporations, having once opened and equipped their
mines, try to direct exploration so as to replace by discovery an
amount of ore equal to that mined in each year or short period.
To place a dollar value on the subsoil resources of the con-
tinental United States for the purpose of drawing up any bal-
ance sheet of assets and liabilities, several assumptions must be
made. It is, for example, assumed that what is desired is the
fair market price at the date of the valuation; in this case 1929,
1939, and 1946. This can only be 'as is, where is', or in the
ground, since any other price will necessarily include reim-
bursement for goods and services, to mention merely two items
necessary to produce the goods and transport them to the point
of sale. These are not to be regarded as part of the value of the
4MineralsYearbook (Bureau of Mines, 1932-35), p. 185.
5See'Iron Ore Supply for the Future', W. 0. Hotchkiss, Economic Geology,
May 1947; and 'The Iron We Need', C. B. Randall, Atlantic Monthly, June 1948.242 PARTII
resource itself. Because only an insignificant portion of any
mineral resource is ever carried in stock as part of the live in-
ventory of industry, the ore must be valued in the ground.
A fair price implies the usual assumption of a willing seller
and a willing buyer, but in each instance the parties to the
transaction review possible alternatives. The farmer, asked to
sell the mineral rights in his land or to give a lease for purposes
of mineral development, compares the amounts promised to
or realized by other farmers for similar rights, while the would-
be lessor will consider whether he can buy or lease equally
good land elsewhere on better terms.
As the subsurface resources of the country, even those of
significant minerals, are much too large for any single pur-
chaser or syndicate to handle, their value can be estimated only
by applying to the whole the values fixed by representative
transactions or by indirect methods. The first method is based
on royalties, the second on calculations of the margin of prob-
able profit.
Mining engineers and mine valuers have developed a well
founded system for working out the value of individual mines,
deposits,,or tracts of land. Since it is to be presumed that the
purpose of a valuation is to fix a price for a transfer at a specific
time and since in most instances that time is the present, most
valuations are directed to finding the present value of the
property, though for special purpdses an earlier or later value
may be taken. For tax purposes the value of the property at the
time any specific law went into effect—such as March 1, 1913—is
important, but in any event returns to be realized only in the
future are discounted to find the equivalent present value. To
do this, it is necessary to determine or estimate the quantity
of recoverable ore in the ground, the rate of profit that may
be made per unit, and then from considerations of market and
of capital to be invested, the rate at which these profits may be
realized. From these data the rate and amount of the annual
returns can be determined. These are then discounted to
present value, and the sum is taken as the value of the property.
Obviously the crucial data are the profit per unit, the rate atSUBSOIL WEALTH 243
whichthe profits accrue, and the number of years they will
continuc. scheme for determining the present value of
future profits or, more probably, the present value of expected
future profits, is frankly based upon the profit motive, since we
live and work in a profit economy.
The spread between the sale price of a product and the cost
of production to that point must of course be enough to cover
the value to the landowner of the material in the ground and
the risk and use of money necessary to induce the investing
public to finance the venture. When mineral properties are
leased, the landowner accepts an agreement that either a cer-
tain proportionate share of the product as produced will be
delivered to him, as is usual with petroleum or, as is more
common with coal, iron, and other minerals, he will receive
a cash price per ton or other Unit as it is produced. Alterna-
tively, the operator may buy outright either the fee to the land
or to the mineral rights, the owner retaining the surface rights;
or the landowner, having given a lease on a royalty basis, may
sell his royalties to third parties. In the petroleum business
there is a wide open market for royalties, which often sell for
as much as or more than the lease itself. The landowner's one-
eighth, not being burdened with costs of production, at times
is estimated to be as valuable as the lessor's seven-eighths, which
have to assume the costs of development and production for the
whole. Incidentally, in mineral mining of various kinds it is
not uncommon for the landowner's value to be estimated (as
above) at one-half the expected net profit from the enterprise.
The time it takes to produce the mineral is important in
determining its value. The sooner a placer miner can get the
gold out of his ground and put it to work earning interest, the
more valuable is it to him. Other things being equal, it is more
profitable to equip the ground with a dredge that can work
the area in ten years than with one that would take twenty;
and, within limits, the same rule applies to equipping lode
mines. In the late 'nineties one of our ablest mining engineers
calculated that most profit could be made from a given area in
the Rand (Africa) if the mine in it was equipped for a life of244 PARTII
fourteen years than if for a longer or shorter time. Many fac-
tors enter such a calculation but in all, time is important. When
a large amount of material is available, for example, limestone,
sand, and gravel, the market mainly fixes the price, profit, and
scale of output. There is no profit in opening mines or quarries
with capacities exceeding the market for the product. Only the
portion of the total reserve in the ground that can be marketed
within the time that a dollar to be received in the future has
an appreciable present worth is of any value—at least any value
that can be stated in dollars. Such is the basis on which mineral
properties are bought and sold.
That there are special risks inherent in the vagaries of de-
posits of ores and other minerals is generally accepted, and
venture capital alone is attracted. To induce entrepreneurs
to take these risks, the expected rate of return must be some-
what higher than in other fields of investment. Dry holes
cost as much as producing wells, and the risks of unexpected
changes in size, position, and grade of ore in a deposit are
numerous and real, justifying the demand for a rate of return
higher than that on a tax exempt bond or a public utility se-
curity in a growing industry. Through many prewar years
mines were valued on a basis of an expected 8 to 12 percent on
the investment plus return of capital, it being realized that,
however large dividends might be, there was an offset to profit
if a capital loss resulted. In 1929, one of the years chosen for
this study, an ore deposit would have been valued on the basis
of expectation of at least an 8 percent annual return on the
capital, plus a sinking fund which, invested at 4 percent com-
pound interest, would accumulate a reserve within the life of
the mine that would equal the capital invested. In more re-
cent years, interest rates have fallen, but it is doubtful that
much money can be had for mining if less than an 8 percent
return is expected, although sinking funds could hardly be set
up at present on more than a 3 or 3.5 percent basis.
As has been indicated, engineers base valuations upon ex-
pected profits from exploitation. Admittedly, this is only one
method of evaluation, and there may be other unrevealed val-SUBSOIL WEALTH 245
ues;but this is the accepted way to measure the present values
of the known reserves at a particular time.
The profit, or value of a ton of ore in the ground, may be
worth more under one management than another. If the
attempt is made to measure the value of ore in the ground by
royalty rates, these may, unless well established throughout an
industry (as in the case of petroleum), reflect mainly the rela.
live bargaining powers of the parties concerned. Finally, while
the value is determined by the nearness of the date of produc-
tion and that date may be so far off there is no present value
that can usefully be expressed in figures, the existence of ore
beyond that having a present worth gives an insurance value
for continuity of operations. At least one large steel company
bought iron ore lands years ago beyond the amount having at
that time any reasonable present worth. It did, however, use-
fully ensure the company's future supply beyond the fifty years
or so that might well have been taken as a basis of value, as well
as its capacity to expand production beyond the point then
appearing probable. Overbuying to some moderate extent,
then, is justifiable to ensure future production, and has proved
worth while in other instances too. But an owner of mineral
lands can be as land-poor as a farmer. The carrying charges on
the investment may and often do lead to losses rather than
profits.
This situation has been true in the anthracite industry,
where the cost of undeveloped reserve lands has hung like the
proverbial millstone around the neck of the mining companies.
In this instance, early buying was less for insurance than in the
hope of creating a monopoly. Economic law brought penalties
greater than any that might have been imposed by antitrust
legislation; moreover, the economic law was self-enforcing and
not subject to repeal.
Nations are expected to live longer than individuals or cor-
and to them security is of primary importance.
Therefore, in setting up the value of subsoil mineral resources
as an item in the balance sheet of national wealth, should some
allowance not be made for their social value? Goodwill, which246 PARTII
can seldom be measured in dollars and cents, is commonly
entered in a balance sheet, if at only $1; why not some of these
other items? How about underground water, so essential to
life and industry but which, even when sold, is merely passed
on at the cost of production? How about the water in our
harbors and navigable rivers? They are useful; do they not
have value?
At present it can be said only that there is no known system
of valuing them although, if enough study is devoted to the
subject, formulas may be worked out for some. However, as
mining has learned to its cost, there is a reverse side to the pic-
ture. Many years ago hydraulic gold mining was stopped in
central California because the discharge of tailings into the
streams allegedly damaged lands, rivers, and harbors below
the mines. Several hundred million dollars worth of gold was
left locked in the unworked gravels. Had this gold been mined
and put to work in industry, it would very possibly have made
a contribution to national wealth that would have offset all the
potential damage. In many places too smelters have been shut
down, mines abandoned, and entire communities wiped out
because of damage or alleged damage to plants and animals by
smoke from the smelter stacks. Since action was taken against
the smelters as 'nuisances', relative values did not enter into the
matter. In other instances, smelting companies were able to
buy out the 'smoke farmers' at less than the losses they would
have incurred if the plants had been closed. These, and numer-
ous stream-pollution cases, emphasize the values minerals have
that may be called 'social' as distinct from 'profit' values. How
should these be assessed?
It is extremely difficult to measure the value in th.e ground
of the primary product, e.g., coal or iron ore, produced by
captive mines belonging to integrated companies. Captive
mines, apparently, will continue to be run as long as the par-
ent industry needs their product to supply its manufacturing
subsidiaries, whether or not they can show a profit. The over-
all cost of the final product sold outside the organization is the
controlling factor, and products are passed on at cost from de-SUBSOIL WEALTH 247
partmentto departmen't or from subsidiary to subsidiary, so
that finally the sales department alone shows a 'profit'. Unless
a considerable outside market exists for the ore or intermediate
product, there is no way to judge the fairness or unfairness of
the price allowed at any given stage. For copper public quota-
tions are usually for the finished product, the electrolytic or
refined metal. Unless all the intermediate plant operations are
considered merely facilities for production, how can anyone be
sure of the worth of a ton of copper-bearing ore in the ground?
As the petroleum industry has become more and more closely
integrated, it has come pan passu to regard everything from oil
well to filling station as a mere facility and not to expect a
tangible profit from each step, such as a refinery or a pipe line.
Pipe lines, it is true, occupy a rather special position, since their
rates are in the province of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and are largely influenced by the effect on actually, or
potentially, competing railway rates.
For purposes of this paper we attempt to establish the value
of the copper, gold, bituminous coal, petroleum, natural gas,
and iron ore in the known reserves in the ground as of 1929,
1939, and 1946. Representative items, they include collectively
the larger portion of the known subsoil mineral wealth of the
country. But even they cannot be evaluated accurately. To
cover the remaining minerals would require long and careful
special studies, leading at best to approximations.
Published sources of many kinds have been consulted, and
numerous discussions held with engineers within and outside
the Department of the Interior. No figure given here is final
or exact; all are first rough approximations and of possible use
only in pointing the way to a more comprehensive and exact
valuation if that is considered worth making. Two general con-
clusions stand out: The present value, in the ground, of the
mineral resources of the United States is surprisingly small
when the tonnages involved and the extent to which the min-
erals are essential to our national way of life and future security
are considered. Mining as a whole, whatever may be true in
specific instances, is not an especially profitable industry and248 PARTH
subsistson a very narrow margin of profit. It is more what is
put into a mine in the way of work and thought than what
is taken out that determines profit or loss.
Two important conclusions follow from the above: The
margin of profit being small, the present value may easily be
wiped out by unsound public policy, such as overtaxation or
any other action that may increase cost or narrow the margin
between it and price. Even delaying action may operate to
decrease present values notably. Technology is supreme, and
the reserve that will most largely influence our future security
is less in the ground than in the brains of the men concerned
with the industry.
A COPPER
Copper is the largest nonferrous metal mining industry; its
production gave rise to more than half of the dollar value of
metal production in 1929. As data on it have been widely circu-
lated, it may well be taken as typical of the group. Estimates of
reserves covering ore in the ground became generally available
when the porphyry coppers were being developed. Until then,
nonferrous mining had been a small unit industry, and capital
for it had come largely from within the industry. Mass produc.
tion required large amounts of capital, for which the industry
had to go to the public; to interest the latter in such invest-
ments, it became necessary and customary to supply data of
the type used by promoters—carefully made engineers' reports
on the ore in the ground available for treatment. Publication
of ore reserves became common, except by such companies as
which depended on vein deposits of a type for
which estimating far ahead of production is expensive and un-
certain. To this day, Anaconda does not publish ore reserve
figures for its Butte properties, though freely doing so for other
properties it controls where other conditions prevail. Since
1910 in the industry as a whole, ore reserve figures have been
generally published and widely discussed.
Two summaries of these ore reserve figures have recentlySUBSOIL WEALTH 249
beenpublished. One is a report on the Copper Industry by the
Federal Trade Commission, of which a summary was published
March 11, 1947. The other is a chapter by Ralph S. Cannon,
Helena M. Meyer, and McHenry Mosier, in the Mineral Posi-
tion of the United States (see note 3). In the first report the
copper content of known ore reserves in the United States is
estimated to be 29 million short tons. In the second, the recov-
erable copper under conditions and prices of 1944 was placed
at 20 million tons. The second report states that in the 'thirties,
estimates credited the reserves with a content of 25 million
tons, but the decrease is not explained. On the face of it, this
suggests a net rate of exhaustion of about one-third million
tons per year. The Federal Trade Commission has not pub-
lished its method, but the estimate is assumed to have been
based mainly on a study of company reports and published
engineer appraisals. The Interior Department experts state
that to the 10 million tons of reserve reported by companies
was added 5 million estimated to be recoverable from reserves
that had been developed or indicated later by the same opera-
tors. A second 5 million tons was added for expected extensions
of known ore bodies or mineralized areas of proved value.
There was no allowance for future discoveries of ore in other
areas or, apparently, for marginal ore that may be brought into
production through technologic improvement or by any ad-
vancement in price not immediately absorbed by increases in
costs of production or wages. All these factors may become
important, and although the margin left for increased recov-
ery through improvement of standard methods becomes pro-
gressively narrower with each step in accomplishment, there
are distinct possibilities of a wholly new technology by virtue
of which ore entirely outside the present field of possible pro-
duction may and almost certainly will be mined whenever the
need is keen enough. The effect of higher prices is less certain.
The wartime plan of premium production brought out rela-
tively little additional copper, but the recent increases in price
to th.e public have brought a surprising amount of marginal250 PARTII
orefrom small producers to the custom smelters. On the whole,
of the two estimates one is perhaps high and the other possibly
a bit overconservative. If, for purposes of this paper, the reserve
is taken to be 20 million tons of copper in ores that can be
produced at the present margin of profit, the estimate will be
at least of the correct magnitude.
Determination of the margin of profit, traced back to the
pound of copper in the ore in the grpund, is not easy. Quota-
tions for copper are based on the metal after it has been mined,
smelted, transported, and refined, so that the published price
covers many items besides the cost of the metal itself. More-
over, the situation is complicated by the fact that copper is
mined in conjunction with accessory metals. Lead, zinc, gold,
silver, molybdenum, and other metals all come from copper
mines in large amounts. Barger and Schurr (p. 369) found
that only 93 percent of the copper produced originated in
'copper' mines, the remainder being supplied by mines of other
metals. Conversely, 2.4 percent of the gold, 2.7 percent of the
silver, nearly 1 percent of the zinc, and .5 percent of the lead
were obtained from treatment of 'copper ores', to say nothing
of the much larger amounts of lead and zinc ores mined as such
but produced by copper mining companies. For many years
Butte was the leading source of silver; now the Utah Copper
Company is second in molybdenum production only to the
Climax Molybdenum Company of Colorado, the world's larg-
est producer. The copper refineries yield also most of such
nickel and cobalt as are produced in the United States as well
as most tellurium, selenium, and various other rare metals.
Determining the cost of copper is indeed a problem in mixed
costs.
It is also a problem to allocate earnings to various branches
of the industry, from mining the ore to selling the fabricated
products; there is no sharply marked dividing line save be-
tween refinery and fabrication plant. In practice, copper min-
ing is considered to embrace only operation of the mines and
beneficiation of the ores up to shipment to the smelters, whereSUBSOIL WEALTH 251
ownershipoften changes. The majority of the transfers are,
however, intracompany affairs, and the terms rarely made pub-
lic. Custom smelters generally pay New York quoted prices
for 95percentof the copper in the ore, minus certain service
charges presumed to cover profit, costs, and losses in process.
Charges are not uniform; and most of the ore treated, even in
custom smelters, is company-owned or comes from subsidiary
or affiliated companies, so that conclusions based on smelting
rates would be inconclusive.
It is also impossible to get satisfactory figures on the basis of
royalties as a measure of the land owners' value for ore in the
ground, since nearly all copper mining companies own in fee
the ground they work. Leasing in the copper and other non-
ferrous mining industries is common enough but is on a small
scale—the lease of a particular stope or part of a mine or vein
or even at times an entire mine. Since the lessor provides many
facilities, and often services, the rates paid are not a fair meas-
ure of the value of the unmined ore. Mines and deposits are,
it is true, frequently valued for sale or for purposes of combina- -
tionor taxation; in these, the expected yield of metal is valued
at the expected price when sold, minus the cost of production
and selling, and credited with the gross amount to be won from
accessory metals. Such valuations are calculated on the theory
that the purpose of operating a mine is to get copper, and that
any returns from other metals are incidental, as they are usually
minor, and should be credited to the cost of producing the
copper; moreover, any plant or operation involved is merely a
facility to the general end and is not entitled to a separate
profit. Analysis of a large number of valuation reports indi-
cated that, from an expected price of 14 cents a pound, there
was a residual value for the copper in the ground of about 1
cent, or about 7 percent of the sales price. Many of the big
mines now operated were opened or equipped between 1910
and 1920; during that period a common figure for the expected
future price of copper was 15 cents a pound. The actual aver-
age price, based on New York quotations for 1910-39 was about252 PARTII
14cents. The average for 1910-20, which covered the years of
World War I, was 18.32 cents. For the next decade, covering
the period from the close of the war to the depression, the aver-
age was 16.09 cents. For the next decade, covering the depres.
sion and recovery up to World War II, the average was 9.76
cents. The general average for the 30 years, 14 cents, may well
be accepted for the next period as a basis for the margin of
profit, whatever, the actual sales price per pound. Under nor-
mal conditions 1 cent a pound is believed to yield a sufficient
margin. Economic forces, or, if necessary, government interfer-
ence, will probably hold prices down to that level. It has evi-
dently been high enough to attract to the industry adequate
capital for expansion as the needs of the country have grown.
A review of the histories of the companies that supply more
than 80 percent of the préduct shows a profitable record.
There have been many important changes in the copper in-
dustry during the last quarter century. Consumption has in-
creased, both by reason of the rise in population and the per
capita advance in consumption. New uses for the metal have
been found and old uses expanded. Scrap metal has become
increasingly important in relation to newly mined ore. Ex-
ports, long an important feature of our metal market, have vir-
tually ceased, and such American copper as now goes outside
the country is largely in manufactured form. Imports have be-
gun and inwaryears were large, about equaling the quantity
needed to meet distinctly war needs. Contrary to common be-
lief, we do not seem to have impoverished our copper resources
to win the war, for the quantity produced apparently did not
exceed much, if at all, that which would have been mined
to supply the market for the same number of good business
years.
Before World War II production of new copper from domes-
tic mines was running about 800,000 tons a year. The average
for 1925-29 was 885,826 tons, according to the Minerals Year-
book. Much lower during the depression, it rose to over a
million tons a year during the war. It is now about 850,000 tonsSUBSOIL WEALTH 253
ayear and, except for labor shortages, can be held at that figure
withoñt undue strain. The known and probable reserves in the
ground can sustain an estimated future output of 900,000 tons
for 20 years without any major reorganization of the industry,
although several of the present big producers will have to cur-
tail heavily or be eliminated in 10 to 15 years. If the past ratio
of discovery to depletion holds, the net amount that will have
to be taken from the present reserve will be only about one-
third that estimated here, and the life of the mines will be
lengthened correspondingly. Based on an annual output of
900,000 tons for the next 20 years and a profit, or return, for
the value of the copper in the ground of 1 cent a pound, the
present value of reserves may be estimated approximately as
follows:
Nine hundred thousand tons a year at 1 cent a pound 'profit'
is equivalent to an annuity of $18 million a year, which, for a
20-year life, would have a present value, if discounted at 3, 3.5,
and 4 percent, of $26,800,000, $25,600,000, and $24,500,000.
On these various assumptions therefore, the 1946 value of the
copper in the ground was about $25 million. Many factors can
alter this estimate, though probably not greatly. The life of the
deposits may and probably will be lengthened by discovery
and, as already noted, by changes in technology. The rate at
which they will be worked may be accelerated by unexpected
demand or retarded by substitution, by easing .the difficulties
in importing metal, or by other economic or political changes.
Finally, the present value will always be influenced to some
degree by the earning power of money. This value may be
used for 1929 and 1939 since data on which significant changes
could be based are unavailable.
B GOLD RESERVES
Because of the unique position gold occupies in the monetary
system—serving as both a basis of exchange and a measure of
value—determining the present value of the gold reserves of254 PART II
the United States is a somewhat different problem from valu-
ing other metal and mineral resources. For gold no selling or
marketing problem is involved; the United States Mint will
buy, at a price fixed by law or by Executive Order, all the gold
produced. In the long run, this has a stabilizing influence on
the economy, but as far as the gold ore reserves are concerned,
the effect on their foreseeable life is pronounced.
Unlike other mining operations, manufacturing, or agricul-
ture, higher costs Of operation in gold mining cannot be passed
on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. Therefore,
when costs are rising, the profit margin is narrowed apprecia-
bly, so that much of the rock in the ground that otherwise
could be mined at a profit no longer has economic value; ore
reserves are greatly reduced, and the life expectancy of those
remaining becomes much less. On the other hand, when oper-
ating costs are decreasing, the spread between the fixed market
price and charges for labor and materials becomes wider, and
rock having a low gold content can be mined profitably; such
gold reserves increase appreciably, and the life expectancy is
greatly prolonged.
Because of these conditions, the gold mining industry runs
counter to other industrial trends, tending to expand during
depressions. It does not have the advantages or disadvantages
of normal competition; its sole competitor is the general level
of prices; this influence is reflected in its life expectancy and in
drastic changes in the margin of profit.
The ultimate effect on gold output is not as drastic as on
gold ore reserves, because a certain percentage of the gold
mined (roughly 30 percent during the past 5 years) is obtained
as a byproduct of copper, lead, and zinc mining. Th.us, even
when costs are extremely high—and even during World War II,
when gold mining was actually prohibited by the War Produc-
tion Board—a certain amount ofgold is inevitably produced as
a byproduct of the recovery of base metals.
The gold ore reserve figures used in this preliminary study
came frQni sources: the 15th International GeologicalSUBSOIL WEALTH 255
Congresspublication on the gold resources of the world (1929),
and the 1947 report on the Mineral Position of the United
States by the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines.6
The figures on ore reserves, total gross value, rate of produc-
tion, and estimated life are based on conditions known to exist
in each year 1929, 1939, and 1947. For the purpose of determin-
ing present value, these seem to be the soundest assumptions
that can be made, although, obviously, gold production
will continue long after the period of 'estimated life' has
expired.
The gold reserves of the United States for these years were
evaluated from two points of view: that of the producer who
operates solely for the profit that can be won from the exploi-
tation of a gold-bearing ore deposit; that of the consumer or
consuming public. The first, perhaps the only one of merit,
is the usual approach to the valuation problem. The second,
which may be termed the 'nationalistic' viewpoint, recognizes
that mineral resources, including gold, have both a strategic
and an economic value to the country as a whole that cannot
readily be measured by the profit accruing to the producer in
the course of the exploitation of a mineral deposit. The impor-
tance of mineral production to national defense, for example,
cannot readily be expressed in dollars. Perhaps the only satis-
factory way of determining present value from this point of
view is to calculate the present value of the amount of 'new
wealth' to be created by exploiting mineral resources. To meas-
ure 'new wealth created' is somewhat difficult, but, briefly
stated, it may be considered to be the gross value of the mineral
or metal produced after due allowance for the return to the
operator of all capital and other invested wealth. The results
are not altogether satisfactory for gold because of the peculiar
nature of the industry. It is believed, however, that this method
might be successfully applied to other metals and minerals.
Loughlin and H. G. Ferguson, 'The Gold Reserves of the United States',
The Gold Resources of the World (XVth International Geological Congress,
South Africa, 1929); F. M. Chace, McHenry Mosier, and C. E. Needham, 'Gold',
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The conclusions concerning the value of gold re-
serves in 1929, 1939, and 1947, examined from. both points of
view, are given in the accompanying summary.
Present Value of Gold Reserves, Summary
1929 1939 1947
Estimated reserves, recoverable
gold (oz.) 26,760,000 38,161,000 25,000,000
Total gross value $553,129,200$1,335,600,000 $875,000,000
An. rate of production (oz.) 1,682,000 3,950,000 1,500,000
or or or
$34,700,000 $138,250,000 $52,500,000
Estimated life (years) 16 10 16.5
VALUATION
Profit method
1)Present value of profit on
basis of av. profit for entire
industry 0 0 0
2)Present value of profit as-
suming that $1 an oz. could
be made $10,000,000 $21,500,000 $10,590,000
(4%+12%) (4%+10%) (3%+8%)
Natzonalzstzc method
1) Assuming no cost, no profit,
& discountingtotalgross
value to present value $208,000,000 $479,000,000 $325,000,000
2) New wealth created, taking
into consideration invested
capital, costs, taxes, & profit 0 0 0
1Profit Method
Inasmuch as the present value of an enterprise is the same as
the present value of the profit it may be expected to yield dur-
ing its lifetime, the present value of a natural resource may be
expressed in terms off the present value of the profit that may
be won from recovering and selling that resource. This prin-
ciple may be applied, using the Hoskold formula, to various
natural resources, such as coal, petroleum, and copper, when
the average margin of profit is fairly well known or can be
safely assumed. However, it cannot be applied successfully to
the gold mining industry as a whole, although it can be applied
to individual ore deposits and to individual mining companies,
for the simple reason that a margin of profit cannot be as-
sumed. In fact, probably more money is spent in the search
for gold than is ever returned. It is difficult to substantiate thisSUBSOIL WEALTH 257
statement by statistics or direct evidence, but it is a view based
on experience and common among mining men.
This abnormal situation arises from the fascination gold
mining has for certain individuals. In many instances, the lure
of possibly enormous profits encourages a share buyer to ven-
ture his money in the search for and exploitation of gold mines
in the hope they will yield dividends commensurate with the
risk. This venturesome practice results in a steady supply of
newly mined gold, which may bring profit to certain companies
or individuals but is not enough to return the invested capital
plus a profit to the industry as a whole.
In view of this condition, it is doubtful that the gold mining
industry has any present value when examined from the profit
point of view, even though several individual mines may reap
enormous profits. Even if one were to assume that gold mines
could make a profit of $1 an ounce, the present value of the
average annual production and of the known reserves is rela-
tively small. For example, in 1947 it would be only $11,000,000
(see Sec. F).
2Nationalistic Method
The consumer or 'nationalistic' viewpoint assumes that, re-
gardless of profit or cost to the producer, the mining and recov-
ery of gold over a period of years create a certain amount of
new wealth for the benefit of the public at large. This new
wealth is in the form of wages to employees, profits to supply
and machinery, merchants, taxes to local, state, and federal gov-
ernments, profits to producers, and so on. In addition to these
public benefits, gold is made available to be used as the basis
of the credit system, for international exchange, and for the
arts and sciences. Obviously, however, any estimate of the true
amount of new wealth created must consider the cost to the
producer of creating this wealth. Otherwise, the process sim-
piy represents the transfer of wealth from one group to another
—a case of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul'.
Because more capital is spent in the searchand exploita-
tion of gol.d deposits than is recovered, it is likely that no new258 PARTH
wealth is created; its present value, therefore, is zero. This does
not mean that the gold mining industry does not have con-
siderable intangible value. It simply means that this value,
from the nationalistic viewpoint, cannot be expressed in dol-
lars.
If one entirely neglects the cost factor, the present value of
the United States gold reserves can be determined by discount-
ing the total gross value of these reserves to the present value,
using as a discount rate the percentage depletion for each year
of the reserve for its estimated life=
This,of p(1+r)n/
course, is a fictitious figure which may be a measure of the mag-
nitude of the turn-over of the industry rather than of the true
value of the gold mined.
C COAL
Coal mining is our largest mining industry; and the known
reserves, measured either in tons or in years of life at the pres-
ent rate of consumption, occupy front rank. The occurrence of
coal deposits is such that it is relatively easy to make fairly
accurate estimates of the quantity in the ground because of
the general persistence of beds. Disappointments have cropped
up in the course of mining; but, in general, and far within the
limits of accuracy demanded by this study, there are no grounds
for large doubt concerning figures for estimated reserves. These
are calculated by the Geological Survey and Bureau of Mines
as sufficient to supply present demands for bituminous coal
and lignite for considerably more than 1,000 years. The anthra-
cite reserves are deemed adequate to last 187 years, but because
of the special circumstances surrounding its production and
consumption, this study will consider bituminous coal alone.
Of this, the reserve is so large that no anxiety about supply is
felt, except for certain kinds of coal in certain areas. There is
of course a final limit, but it is far away; although coal is not
as unlimited in quantity as the reserve supply of magnesium
and salt, derived from both land mines and the sea, or nitrates,SUBSOIL WEALTH 259
derivedfrom the atmosphere, for all practical purposes it may
be regarded as unlimited. In coal mining, the coal itself has
always been the cheapest material the miner handled, hence
it has been especially difficult to reach any high degree of
efficiency from a conservation standpoint. To say that more
than half the coal is left in the ground is an understatement,
and its very abundance has led to much economic waste
through overexpansion of mining whenever a temporary mar-
ket shortage has produced an apparent scarcity of supply. After
1921, according to Treasury data, and until 1940 the coal indus-
try of the United States ran at a loss, such profits as were made
by a few companies being more than offset by deficits of the
many.7 Apparently it is only in war years, when the sudden
increase in demand and the national shortage of labor and
supplies temporarily prevent the opening and equipping of
new mines, that coal mining yields a gain. A big war every gen-
eration or a big strike every year or so can hardly be considered
nationally profitable even if one result does happen to be a
temporary profit to our biggest mining industry. It is mani-
festly difficult to evaluate a business that for so much of the
time operates at a loss, however necessary and beneficent it
may be to the national economy and to defense.
The bituminous coal industry was equipped in 1946 to turn
out 620 million net tons a year—far less than demand. Since
1915, however, there have been more years when the market
called for less than 500 million tons than when it has called
for more. At the depth of the depression demand totaled as
little as 300 million tons. In the years since World War I coal
has steadily lost markets to competing fuels and to hydro
power; the higher price established during the recent war
forced a greater efficiency in burning. With an overcapacity of
20-25 percent and widespread monetary losses from mining, the
hope of profits and the desire of individual fuel-using indus-
tries for an assured supply induced a sufficient flow of capital
into the industry to maintain production and provide for some
expansion. Apparently the present expected rate of profit is
7MineralsYearbook, 1943, p.838.260 PARTII
sufficientto keep the industry functioning. Both costs of pro-
duction and prices at. the mine have risen, but the margin has
been substantially the same for the last 40 years. It is this
margin—the measure of the value of coal in the ground—that
is crucial. The operator is little benefited by a higher sale price
if his costs and taxes rise in the same ratio. Moreover, he cannot
afford to pay more for additional tonnage in the ground, either
in the form of royalty or by purchase in fee; these costs have
apparently kept pace with increases in price and seem likely to
continue to do so.
Of several reasons for the slim prospect of higher profits from
coal mining, three are outstanding. First, since wages are still
the largest element in production cost, higher rates of pay eat
up the economies in other elements. Increased mechanization
is transferring part of this cost from labor to capital, but the
charge for the latter, despite falling interest rates, does not
seem to decrease as rapidly as labor cost rises. The miners have
succeeded in absorbing most of the profit from mechanization
and may well press for more. Their standard of living has risen
with their wages; though socially, and probably economically,
a good thing, this is not conducive to lessening demand for
higher pay. As opportunities have opened and wages have risen
in other industries, fewer boys in miners' families have fol-
lowed their fathers' trade—mining is not unique in this respect.
Second, the likelihood of higher taxes in the future, though
less certain, is ominous. The progressive demands on govern-
ment put cumulative pressure on legislative bodies and tax
authorities to pounce on any possible source of revenue. The
power to tax has been well said to be the power to destroy; but
as long as an industry continues either to breed capital within
or attract it from without, fear of killing the proverbial goose
that lays the golden egg is unlikely to prevent tax authorities
from making heavier assessments or raising rates.
The third factor is competition, not only with alternative
sources of energy but within the industry itself. So much good
coal land is available for development that competition is keen
within the industry, nearly everywhere and always. Sellers'SUBSOIL WEALTH 261
markets are rare in the coal industry, and selling agents and
staffs are prone to cut prices to the limit. Even a small portion
of the coal sold at too low a price may ruin the market for a
large part of the output, and once reduced, prices are hard to
restore.
For these and other less important reasons, the margin of
profit, and hence the value of coal in the ground, is not likely
to rise as long as an adequate tonnage comes to the market on
the present basis. If profits become larger, it is more than prob-
able that labor will demand a bigger share, that the taxing
authorities will grab them, or that competing sales forces will
dissipate them by cutting prices to get tonnage from competi-
tors. Therefore it seems safe to predicate future earnings on
the current margin of profit; in the absence of an elaborate
study and many more data than are now available, this mar-
ginal profit per ton is the readiest measure of the value of the
coal in the ground. It is the expectation of realizing such profit
that induces coal production.
Unfortunately, no estimated figure for expected profit per
ton can be accepted with full confidence. Some data may be
obtained from examination of royalties, some from actual
profits revealed or predicated in case of purchases of land or
consolidation of companies, and some from studies of opera-
tions of particular companies, but the exact figure must be
largely a matter of opinion. As such, rather than as an ascer-
tained fact, it is believed that the amount left over after more
immediate bills have been met and therefore available—or
expected to be available—to pay for the coal itself, is of the
order of 10 cents a ton. It is believed that, over a term of years
and on the average for the whole industry, not more than this
amount has been realized from mining itself, and that, on the
expectation of such profit, adequate capital to maintain the
industry at the present status is likely to continue to be forth-
coming. This price would correspond to about $500 an acre
for coal rights in undeveloped land containing a 5 foot bed of
coal of good grade and fairly accessible. Government leases of
coal land in the West generally call forcents a ton; however,262 PARTII
large mines have been opened and operated at twice this rate,
although the coal, while thick, was lignitic rather than bitu-
minous but so situated as to permit open-pit mining. Near
centers of consumption, or with coal of superior grade, a higher
price would be paid; however, as a general average, the figure
is believed to be near enough the truth to serve.
The present value of the coal reserve depends on the number
of tons that will be mined and the rate at which it will be
brought to market as well as on the unit value. In view of the
virtually unlimited amount available, the tonnage mined will
depend upon market conditions, and the term of years through
which production can be figured will be restricted only by the
decreasing present value of the returns. Except for temporary
heavier demand in war years and smaller demand in deep de-
pression, output has been fairly stable since 1915—between 500
and 600 million tons a year. The long steady rise in demand
from the beginning of the century was checked by the initial
effects of World War I. Since then the trend has been generally
about level, year after year, and 500 million would be approxi-
mately correct as the normal output. Assuming, as seems prob-
able, that industrial growth will offset the effects of competition
of other sources of energy plus any additional loss of market
due to greater efficiency in the use of coal, only some extraordi-
nary change could be expected to upset this assumption of
future market.
Another war would do so. Failure of the supply of petroleum
or natural gas would do so, at least temporarily. A shift in inter-
national demand might do so permanently, as it is now doing
temporarily. Application of atomic energy to industry might
in time ruin the coal industry, but it is hardly likely to do this
within any short period. These various possibilities cannot be
balanced with certainty, and we can only assume a future pro-
duction rate of 500 million tons a year as a conservative esti-
mate of average demand. Coal will be produced at present
values for 40 or 50 years. Although coal to be produced in the
years beyond has some present value, it cannot be reduced to a
dollars and cents figure with any degree of assurance. TheSUBSOIL WEALTH 263
problem,then, becomes one of ascertaining the present value
of the future output through 40 to 50 years of 500 million tons
of coal at 10 cents expected profit a ton; in other words, the
present value of an annuity of $50 million for the periods
stated and at assumed discount rates. For reasons already given,
these are calculated at 3, 3.5, and 4 percent, determined by the
assumed rate at which depletion reserves could have been set
to work in 1946, 1939, and 1929. For convenience, the results
were calculated for both 40 and 50 year periods. To the objec-
Discount, % 40 years, $ billions 50 years., $ billions
1929 4 0.990 1.074
1939 3.5 1.068 1.173
1946 1.156 1.286
tion that a billion and a fraction dollars is a very small sum to
assign as the present value of 20-25 billion tons of coal, it may
be pointed out that although the coal may be sold for $2 to
$2.50 per ton at the mine and bring in $40-60 billion, these
sums include not only what is paid for the coal but the cost of
producing it, and the latter is by no means an asset to the land
owner.
The instructive feature of these calculations is the small pres-
ent cash value of an undeveloped resource, even though it is
large in amount and essential to industry before it is put to
work. The United States is rich not because of its natural re-
sources but because of its people. With about 7 percent of the
world's population, it produces half the world's goods because
it puts its latent resources to work.
The foregoing value does not take into consideration the
possible expansion of coal production if a synthetic liquid
fuels industry is established in the United States. Such a devel-
opment might well treble the demand for coal in two or three
decades.
D PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS
Of the three years specified by the Conference on Research in
Income and Wealth, the estimates of the current tharket value
of the proved oil and gas reserves of the United States at the264 PARTII
close of 1929 and 1939 present the most difficulty. At the close
of 1929 the development of the oil industry was about midway
between the discovery of the Oklahoma City field and the huge
East Texas field. The oil states generally had not yet adopted
the policy of regulating oil and gas production, and the more
modern accomplishments of petroleum engineering were first
appearing. Current data on the proved oil and gas reserves
were not accessible to the public and values were still affected
by price changes due to surges of excess supply. More data are
available on the proved reserves at the close of 1939, but prices
then were lower than in the preceding 3 years, and gasoline
prices at the refineries were moving down. Accordingly, it is
more difficult to determine the value of the proved oil and gas
reserves at the close of 1929 and 1939, and any such determina-
tion is subject to more widely divergent viewpoints than is
determination of the value of such reserves as of the end of
1946.
Within the limitations of the data and recognizing that the
request is for approximate estimates only, the following values,
in billions as of December 31, are suggested for the proved oil
and gas reserves of the United States, producible through exist-
ing wells by methods currently in use: 1929, $6.5; 1939, $9;
1946, $15. These total values were obtained by multiplying
the number of barrels or cubic feet of natural gas in the proved
reserves by the value per barrel of oil or cubic foot of natural
gas at which such oil or gas reserves were evaluated in the trades
and transfers of oil and gas properties at the time. The calcula-
tion is based on average values and assumes that the values ex-
pressed in the transfer of individual properties are applicable
to the entire reserves. The estimates are an expression of value
that is not related to the corporate valuation of such assets or
reflected generally in the purchase and sale of securities on the
markets.
The 1946 figure was calculated by applying 50 cents a barrel
to the approximately 24 billion barrels of crude oil and liquid
hydrocarbons in the proved oil reserves and slightly less than 2
cents a thousand cUbic feet to the 160 trillion cubic feet in theSUBSOIL WEALTH 265
provedgas reserves, giving $12 billion for oil and $3 billion for
natural gas. Fifty cents a barrel is a minimum, as transactions
at higher prices were being made at the close of 1946 and
subsequently.
Opinions of individual buyers concerning the future supply
and price trend of oil are not identical, nor are their needs
equal; so these differences can be expected to influence the
values placed upon such reserves by individual buyers.
The oil reserve data used for 1929 and 1939 were those com-
piled for crude oil by the Petroleum Administration for War,
plus an estimated quantity for other liquid hydrocarbons,
natural gasoline, and condensates. The reserve data for natural
gas were the estimates customarily in use—about 45 trillion
feet in 1929 and about 70 trillion in 1939. The proved oil
reserves, as estimated by the Petroleum Administration for
War at the close of 1939, are higher than the American Petro-
leum Institute estimates for the close of 1946, but the average
posted crude oil price at the end of 1946 was substantially
higher than in 1939.
Opinions will of course vary concerning the value of the
1929 and 1939 reserves, and the figures suggested here repre-
sent an intermediate viewpoint between higher or lower esti-
mates. Less difference of opinion can be expected about the
value of the 1946 reserves. Undeveloped and undiscovered
petroleum resources of the United States are not included in
the foregoing estimates. The estimates are based on proved
reserves, which have been drilled and are in production status.
The value added by the drilling and equipping of the wells
obviously accounts for the major portion of the total estimated
value.
For the purposes of this study an evaluation exclusive of
values added by drilling and equipping wells is desired. Such
an appraisal of oil and gas resources in the ground can be
approximated from royalty payments to land owners stipulated
in leases taken prior to drilling. As previously stated, 12.5 per-
cent is well established as the land owners' share of petroleum.
Royalty rates for natural gas and liquefied products derived266 PARTII
therefromvary considerably, and are usually somewhat less
than those for petroleum in recognition of the heavy capital.
investment required for liquefaction plants. It is assumed that
they may average 10 percent. Applying these rates to the dollar
value of oil and gas production in 1929, 1939, and 1946, and
calculating the present worth o.f these annual royalty pay-
ments over the period indicated by known reserves and produc-
tion rates in these three years, the value of oil and gas in the
ground exclusive uf value added by drilling and equipping
wells is:1929, $1,674 million; 1939, $1,971 million; 1946,
$3,336 million. The present worth computations assume an 8
percent return on invested capital with sinking fund rates at
4 percent in 1929, 3.5 percent in 1939, and 3 percent in 1946.
Petroleum reserves were calculated as equal to 13 years of pro-
duction in 1929, 19 years in 1939, and 14 years in 1946. Those of
natural gas were equal to 23, 29, and 39 years in the same
years.
EIRONORE
Alarge amount of data is available on the reserves and value of
iron ore, particularly in the Lake Superior region, which sup-
plies 80 to 85 percent of the annual production. In Minnesota
the tax authorities have collected and published the essential
figures on reserves and value since' 1914. In other states the
federal and state geological surveys have made fairly satisfac-
tory if less complete estimates. Burchard, Johnson, and Mel-
cher, of the Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines, have
summarized the estimates and allow 3,726 million gross tons
for the measured and indicated ore, 1,755 million for the in-
ferred ore, and 62,915 million for the potential ore. Of these
amounts, the first corresponds most closely to estimates of
known reserves of ore in the ground, as that term is generally
used. Of this total, 1,306 million tons are credited to the Lake
Superior region, 1,561 to the southeastern United States, and
536 to the northeastern region, including New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The estimate for the southeasternSUBSOIL WEALTH 267
depositsis a little above other figures and for the northeastern
a little below; but the ores of the southeast are perhaps most
surely estimated in advance, and Burchard has long and inti-
mate knowledge of them. The mode of occurrence of the ores
in the northeastern region is such that it is much more difficult
to make good estimates in advance of close drilling, which has
been done in only a few districts. After many years during
which the region had been only a minor producer, it has re-
cently attracted renewed interest.
An excellent general summary of the whole iron ore prob-
lem has been made by C. M. White, President of the Republic
Steel Corporation, which. has carried on active exploration in
the northeastern region as well as in other areas.8 White thinks
each of the three regions now contains reserves of approxi-
mately a billion tons. There is no doubt that the total iron in
the crust of the earth is virtually unlimited, and if in all dis-
tricts the means can be found to process and work ores of the
low grade mined in other producing districts, there is virtu-
ally no limit to the ore reserves. It is a problem in technology
to convert rock into ore, and the critical point is the ratio
between rate of discovery plus technologic development and
that of depletion by use. White's figures on experience in the
Lake Superior region permit some rather comforting infer-
ences. The reserves for the entire region for 1939 are given as
1,380,900,000 tons, and for 1946, 1,144,129,000, a decrease of
236,811,000 tons. But in the 7 years shipments totaled
526,923,000 tons, a difference of 290,112,000 tons, which could
have come only from additional discoveries. In other words,
while the mines shipped 75 million tons a year, 41 million
came from discoveries that otherwise would have been added to
the reserve. This indicates a ratio of discovery to production of
55 percent for the principal iron ore region of the United
States during years of unusually heavy shipments and of cur-
tailed exploration due to wartime shortages of labor and sup-
plies, to say nothing of the deterring effect'on exploration of
S'IronOre and the Steel Industry', an address delivered before the American
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, March 1947.268 PARTII
the policy of taxing reserves in the ground for all the years after
discovery and before production.
Recently concern has been voiced over the heavy draft on
our iron ore reserves during the war; for example, by Hotch-
kiss in Economic Geology, May 1947. There can be little doubt
that the big open pits in high grade ore on the Mesabi range,
the shock absorbers for so many years, are rapidly nearing
exhaustion. The Lake Superior iron ore reserves as a whole,
however, are not being as seriously depleted as would appear at
first glance. According to the present showing, a life of 27 years
is indicated, even at wartime production rates and without
further technologic developments that may reasonably be ex-
pected. About other ore producing regions less definite state-
ments can be made. In the Northeast exploration is much less
complete, and much heavier demands on it are to be expected
to supply ore to the Atlantic coast steel plants reasonably cer-
tain to be built. In the Southeast, although there is no difficulty
about total reserves, there is doubt about the continued avail-
ability of grades originally used to supply southern furnaces.
The rich brown ores have been heavily drawn on, and the hard
red hematite ore of the Birmingham district now being mined
does not, on the average, contain as much iron as that mined in
earlier years. In very general terms and for the country as a
whole, it may be stated that whereas formerly 2 tons of iron ore
yielded 1 ton of pig iron, now 2.5 tons are required. Th.e south-
ern companies are already hunting for richer ores that may be
imported to improve the furnace charges. The conditions that
once made the Birmingham district the cheapest large pro-
ducer of pig iron have changed; in time, this will certainly be
reflected in the value of ore in the ground, so that conservative
figures must be taken in valuing the country's reserves. An
independent appraisal on the basis of present royalties would
probably put the value at 15 cents, or even more, per ton in the
ground, but it seems wiser to use the 12.5 cents assessed by the
Minnesota Tax Commission for the 1,034,300,000 known Min-
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This places, as of May 1945, a value of $129 million on the
Minnesota reserves. State agencies estimated total reserves for
the Lake Superior district to be 1,381 million tons in 1939 and
1,144 million in 1946. Applying the Minnesota assessment rate
to the region as a whole, the total value of the Lake Superior
ores in the ground may have been $173 million in 1939 and
$143 million in 1946. All these figures are low, since the old
range ore found in other parts of the Lake Superior district is
of higher grade than the Mesabi, which dominates the Min-
nesota figures. Old range ore is also more expensive to produce,
so that a more exact statement cannot be made with the data at
hand. On the basis of the Department of the Interior estimates,
the Lake Superior ore reserves may be considered to have a
present value in the ground of about $163 million. If it is con-
sidered that the ore reserves of the entire country have a similar
value per ton, the total would now be approximately $466
million. Although no attempt has been made to work out exact
figures for 1929 and 1939, such data as are available seem to
indicate that they would not differ from those for 1946 to any
large degree.
One factor that may materially influence realization of this
sum is change in practice. It is not iron or even iron ore con-
sumption that fixes demand and prices, but steel consumption;
the quantity (in tons) of iron ore used to produce 1 ton of steel
fell from 1.47 in 1912 to 1.10 in 1937, rose to 1.45 in 1942 but
fell to 1.13 in 1943.
Before World War I the ratio of iron to scrap in a steel fur-
nace was of the order of 1.1. At the moment, owing to a short-
age of scrap and an exceptional demand for steel, the blast
furnaces are being called upon to furnish unusual amounts of
iron; but this does not seem likely to Continue, and the trend
of more steel from less iron ore will probably be resumed, since
the stock of steel in use and hence the amount potentially avail-
able as scrap is increasing. This may, in time, seriously affect
the demand for iron ore and compensate, to a degree not easy
to evaluate, for any scarcity that would otherwise develop from
the exhaustion of ore reserves.270 PARTII
FCONCLUSIONS
On the basis of the five minerals studied, we may estimate the
value of all subsoil mineral resources. In 1929 these commodi-
Reserves 1929 1939 1916
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Copper 25 25 25
Gold 10 22 11
Coal ' 1,074 1,173 1,286
Oil and gas 1,674 1,971 3,336
Iron ore 466 466 466
Total 3,249 3,657 5,124
ties contributed 67 percent of the value of all minerals pro-
duced in the United States as reported by the Bureau of Mines;
in 1939, 74 percent, and in 1946, 75 percent. No attempt has
been made to determine the values of the other resources that
contribute the remaining percent. Among. these are
anthracite and the nonmetallic minerals such as stone, sand,
gravel, cement, and lime which are mined under conditions of
royalty payments and unit-profit margins not greatly unlike
those for coal and iron ore. Nonferrous metals other than cop-
per and coal also contribute significantly to the nation's annual
output and these are produced under conditions similar to
those prevailing in copper and gold mining. Consequently, for
the purposes of this study and in the absence of more specific
data we may apply to all minerals the average ratio of resource
value to the value of annual production as determined by our
sample of five minerals. The order of magnitude is: 1929 and
1939, $5 billion; 1946, $9 billion.
In appraising the significance of these figures it should be
clearly understood that the present value of the subsoil re-
sources of the United States cannot be estimated precisely.
Such tests as have been made in the course of this study have
led to figures much smaller than those commonly published.
The discrepancy is probably due to confusion between the sale
price at the mine and the value in the ground. As already
pointed out, the former includes the cost of production as well
as the value in the ground. Oil and gas are an interesting illus-SUBSOIL WEALTH 271
tration. Swanson's estimates give a present value to the reserves
of these materials much higher than their value to fee owners,
larger than any other reserve studied here, and even larger
than the total for all resources as computed above. To be sure,
petroleum ranks first in gross sales ($2,093 million in 1945),
and natural gas ($821 million in 1945) is well up toward the
top. These are intrinsically high value materials and cost of
discovery is one of the chief elements in production costs. Fur-
thermore, the normally short interval between discovery and
production has made the petroleum and gas industries unusu-
ally profitable. Nonetheless, it does not seem probable that the
15 years of known petroleum supply is 'worth 12 times as much
as the 3,000 year suppl.y of bituminous coal. Here in particular
there should be some way of bridging the gap between the
present value of the coal reserve as a source of profit and its
value to the nation. The marked difference doubtless arises
from the fact that petroleum companies refine and market
petroleum products as well as produce crude petroleum, there-
by retaining their hold on the major share of the profits of the
industry, while the major profits of coal mining go to the rail-
ways, steel companies, or the marketing agencies. The major
users of coal supply funds to keep coal mining active without
too much regard to whether the mining operators make money
or not as long as coal is shipped over the railways or supplies
the coke ovens. In part, the same problem appears in the case
of iron, where the larger mining operations are conducted by
subsidiaries of steel companies. Just what would be the effect
of a nicer adjustment of profits between parent and subsidiary
companies or between department and department cannot be
foretold with certainty; but, in justice to mining, it should be
recognized that all too often mines are run at a loss in order
that another industry may pay a 6 percent or larger dividend.
It should be remembered that the estimated values pre-
sented here are based upon quantities of known mineral in
the ground or mineral believed, with good reason, to be there.
Beyond this there are, in most categories, quantities of poten-
tial ore that can fairly be considered enormous and, in many272 PARTII
instances, the technology necessary for bringing these 'poten-
tial' ores into the probable or even actual reserves has already
been worked out or is not far from perfected. For various rea-
sons, there is no economic incentive to apply these methods
now, and usually it would be inadvisable to do so. The value
of these resources to the national economy and security is of
course very much greater but cannot be measured.
For reasons given above, the valuations made here concern
the mineral in the ground, not at the mine shaft, and all are
present values. It is as if an inventory were taken of the stock
on the shelves of a store to fix a price for the sale of the business.
Common experience has shown that such a sale yields a smaller
sum than would be realized if the same goods were sold in the
natural course of continuing trade. The larger value would be
more satisfactory, but at present there is no accepted unit of
measurement.
Another matter that should not be forgotten is this: The
value of mineral resources is determined quite as often by mar-
ket conditions as by quantities of ore in reserve. Were markets
adequate, the present annual coal output of the United States
could be multiplied many times, with profit to the national
economy and without danger to our future safety. The dif-
ference between present and future values of adollar to be
received is so great that the time of production rather than the
quantity in reserve determines the present value of many
minerals.
Counting eggs before they are hatched is admittedly ill ad-
vised, but the fact that chickens are not yet born does not imply
that our grandchildren will not have eggs for breakfast. It
does, however, point to sound reasons for keeping our chickens
well fed and healthy; and, if we are to enjoy continuing pros-
perity in the mineral industries, it is as essential to avoid public
measures, such as taxation of developed reserves, that will re-
tard growth as to stimulate technologic improvement in dis-
covery and beneficiation. The vast quantities of basic metals
in the ground have little or no value until dug out and put toSUBSOIL WEALTH 273
work.From time to time it may be necessary to shift from the
production of one mineral to that of another as scarcity ap-
proaches and substitution becomes advisable. Minerals are
wasting assets, but mining need not be a diminishing industry.
For all resources, the ratio of discovery to depletion is crucial.0